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We examine the nexus between land transfers and human capital formation. A sequence of
land redistributions enables the beneficiaries to educate their children and thus to escape
from poverty. A successful land reform allows the transition of a society from an
agriculture-based state of poverty to a human capital–based developed economy. We find
that a temporary state of inequality among the poor is unavoidable. Finally, we discuss the
political economy of land reform, whether access to land markets should be allowed for
beneficiaries of land reforms, and property rights issues.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Motivation
Half the world’s population lives on less than 2 U.S. dollars per day [WDI (2004)]
and 19% (980 million) on less than 1 U.S. dollar [UN (2007)]. The first of
the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations stipulates that the
proportion of people who live on less than 1 U.S. dollar a day and the proportion
who suffer from hunger should be halved by 2015. Seventy five percent of these
people live in rural regions, and in many underdeveloped countries agriculture is
the largest sector of the economy [Burgess and Stern (1993, p. 784)]. Therefore
policies combating poverty need to focus largely on rural areas where agriculture
is prevalent and land is an important factor in production. Inefficient land use
is widespread in developing countries and the lack of land ownership is one
major source of poverty [Ravallion and Sen (1994)]. Hence, land reforms may be
beneficial in the fight against poverty.
At the same time, underinvestment in human capital is widespread in developing
economies. About 774 million adults worldwide are illiterate, and more than
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764 million of them live in developing countries. Thus nearly 23% of the people
in developing countries are illiterate. The highest illiteracy rate is found in sub-
Saharan Africa, where the figure is 40.8% [UNESCO (2007)]. Therefore, what is
required for overcoming poverty is a strategy inducing human-capital formation
in agrarian societies. In accord with this, Johnson (1997) found that a major
determinant of success in the transformation of the United States from a poor
agriculture-based to a wealthy industrial nation was bringing education to all
levels of the rural community.
In this paper we examine whether and how land reforms can engineer a tran-
sition from backwardness to literacy and growth. Our analysis starts from the
main insights of unified growth theory [Galor and Weil (2000); Galor (2005)] that
human-capital formation played an important role in the transition from stagnation
to growth. The rise in the demand for human capital in the process of industri-
alization and its effect on human-capital formation, technological progress, and
the onset of the demographic transition were the main triggers in the transition
from stagnation to growth. As the demand for human capital emerged, variations
in human-capital formation and therefore in the rate of technological progress and
the timing of the demographic transition significantly affected the distribution of
income in the world economy. We suggest that land reforms can be a critical force
in human-capital formation.
1.2. The Economic Problem
The economic problem we are analyzing is based on two subproblems. First, in
developing countries, children cannot attend school because they have to contribute
to family income by child labor to ensure survival. Perfect capital markets would
enable parents to borrow against expected future earnings achieved by education
and thus to invest in the human capital of their children. However, the poor
in developing countries do usually not have access to capital markets, and the
children’s education must be financed by the household’s current earnings and
assets. Insufficient income and assets lead to the failure of human capital formation,
which then perpetuates itself. The second subproblem is that developing countries
often lack an effective tax system [Burgess and Stern (1993)]. Such governments
cannot generate direct income support for the poor via taxes and subsidies. As
developing countries are mostly agrarian economies, the most important asset and
source of income is land. Consequently, land transfers may represent a practicable
alternative to direct income transfers in countries that do not have an effective
financial administration.
Because rural poverty and lack of land ownership go hand in hand [Ravallion
and Sen (1994)], it follows that land reforms are a promising tool in fighting
poverty and the associated problems of education and child labor. This is the focus
of the paper.
To analyze the ways of designing a land reform that will enable a soci-
ety to overcome poverty, we consider a two-sector economy with overlapping
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generations, where each generation consists of a continuum of individuals. Parents
may have altruistic preferences regarding their children, but they will only invest
in the education of their children if their income exceeds a particular level. Land
enables households to enter a higher income bracket, which may ensure education
for children and reduce poverty.
Evidence from reforms in India and the Philippines supports our model. These
land reforms had a strong impact on investment in human and physical capital and
on the long-term growth of income, productivity, and investment [Deininger et al.
(2000, 2007)]. Therefore, successful land reforms can engineer a transition from
stagnation to growth via human-capital formation.
1.3. Results
Our main results are as follows: Successful land reforms consist of a sequence
of land transfers. To accumulate human capital, only a (small) part of the society
should receive land transfers at a particular point in time. This enables beneficiaries
to receive land of sufficient size. A temporary state of inequality among the poor
is thus unavoidable. A successful land reform allows the transition of a society
from an agriculture-based state of poverty to a human capital–based developed
economy.
Moreover, allowing open access to land markets increases efficiency in rural
production, but due to socially adverse land sales, may induce a decline of human-
capital formation. This may cause the failure of the reform. Therefore beneficiaries
of land reforms ought not to be allowed to sell land for a particular period of time.
Land purchases, however, should not be restricted. Finally, we identify the political
barriers to land reforms and we discuss the property rights issues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we
outline the link to the relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section
4 gives an analysis of how a successful land reform needs to be designed and of
the consequences the reform may have for transition and inequality. In Section 5
important extensions are discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2. RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. Our focus on human
capital in a model with a poverty trap goes back to Galor and Zeira (1993). In an
environment where the capital market is imperfect and human capital investment
is indivisible, the distribution of wealth affects the macroeconomic outcome, as
households with insufficient wealth do not invest in human capital. This link also
appears in our model.1 For developing countries, Deininger and Olinto (2000) and
Bigsten and Levin (2005) state that due to credit rationing, major inequality in
asset distribution seems harmful for growth. Our results suggest that temporary
inequality of land holdings and income among the poor is necessary to induce
growth. Our paper provides an alternative perspective to Galor et al. (2009), who
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S136510050909049X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 15:19:18, subject to the Cambridge Core
530 HANS GERSBACH AND LARS-H. R. SIEMERS
show that inequality in the distribution of land ownership adversely affects the
promotion of human capital and the pace of the transition from an agricultural to
an industrial economy.
There are only a few formal land-reform models. Gersovitz (1976) and Bell
(2003) stress that the effect of land reforms on aggregate output and factor prices
is ambiguous and depends on particular conditions. Unlike our work, these anal-
yses are static. Dasgupta and Ray (1986, 1987) and Ray and Streufert (1993)
show that unemployment and undernourishment may be rooted in inequality of
initial land ownership. This suggests that land reforms can mitigate unemployment
and undernourishment. In a way similar to our results, they find that small land
transfers will have no long-term growth effect. Moene (1992) also emphasizes
the connection between labor productivity and nourishment, but demonstrates that
due to general equilibrium effects, land reforms may only reduce poverty in coun-
tries where land is scarce. Finally, within a cooperative game theory approach,
Horowitz (1993) considers a model where agents can decide to accept a land
reform proposal or enter a conflict. Similarly to our findings, the optimal reform
proposed by Horowitz consists of a sequence of redistributions. However, whereas
Horowitz’s aim is to prevent social conflict, our aim is to overcome poverty traps
and describe how the sequence of land redistributions should be designed so that
human capital formation and growth will occur. Hence our objective transcends
the generation of a more egalitarian distribution of landownership.
Our paper is complementary to a recent paper by Proto (2007), who shows that
tenurial contracts in agriculture can be an initial source of wealth accumulation
for dynasties of the poor and can help to educate offspring. This process enables
the economy to develop into a modern form. Our model shares the perspective of
Proto’s model, indicating that agrarian reform can have important effects on other
sectors. We examine how a sequence of land reforms can move a poor economy
toward literacy and growth, taking into account the human capital accumulation
and migration to the manufacturing sector induced by such reforms.
Discussion of the main issues connected with land reforms has been provided in
excellent survey articles, for example by de Janvry and Sadoulet (1996), Banerjee
(1999), Deininger (1999), Deininger and May (2000), and Conning and Robinson
(2001). This literature suggests that access to assets such as land improves access
to credit markets because land can be used as collateral, can provide benefits as
insurance against consumption fluctuations, and enables the poor to undertake
indivisible productive investments. Overall, land reforms should improve equity,
efficiency, and hence aggregate growth. Such benefits have also been stressed
by agricultural economists [e.g., Tomich et al. (1995)]. However, complementary
investments in education or infrastructure are required to secure the success of
land reforms [e.g., Finan et al. (2005)]. Our analysis suggests that only a sequence
of partial land transfers with restrictions to selling land can achieve the gains
associated with such a reform.
There are also a vast number of empirical studies reviewing historical land
reforms and their outcomes [see Deininger and Feder (1998); Alston et al.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S136510050909049X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 15:19:18, subject to the Cambridge Core
LAND REFORMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 531
(1999, 2000); Deininger (1999); Dı´az (2000); Fearnside (2001); Benjamin and
Brandt (2002)]. Platteau (1992), Attwater (1997), Deininger and Feder (1998),
and Fearnside (2001) stress the importance of the role played by well-defined
property rights and identify the advantages of some communally owned property.
Finally, new types of land reform are discussed by Banerjee (1999), Deininger
(1999), and Besley and Burgess (2000). Key sources of land reform failure have
been imperfect capital, insurance, and land markets that have led to insufficient
investments, made macroeconomic shocks very dangerous for land reform bene-
ficiaries, and forced corresponding distress sales. Additionally, the beneficiaries’
lack of knowledge about agriculture has reinforced the danger of failure. We argue
that, even without distress sales, open access to land sales markets may endanger
the overall success of a land reform.
3. MODEL
Our model builds on Galor and Zeira (1993), Basu (1999), and Bell and Gersbach
(2009). Consider an OLG structure in which individuals live for two periods:
childhood and adulthood. Each generation consists of a continuum of households
represented by the interval [0, 1]. Each individual gives birth to one child. Thus
each household is a family comprising one adult and one child. Each individual
is endowed with one unit of time. Adults spend all their time working. Children’s
time is used partly for child labor and partly for attending school. Time is indexed
by t (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .).
3.1. Human Capital Formation
An adult i ∈ [0, 1] possesses λit efficiency units of labor in period t , where λ ≥ 1
is a natural measure of an adult’s human capital. λ = 1 represents pure, unskilled
labor. Human capital is formed in childhood by schooling. Let the portion of
childhood devoted to education in period t be denoted by eit ∈ [0, 1]. The residual
time, 1 − eit , is used for child labor. Additionally, in the course of rearing a
child, the adult provides the child with a certain capacity to build human capital
for adulthood and thus reinforces the effect of schooling. We assume that this
additional effect increases with the level of the parents’ human capital, λit . The
child’s endowment of efficiency units of labor on reaching adulthood at time t + 1
is assumed to be given by the following relationship:
λi,t+1 = 1 + h(eit )λit . (1)
The function h(eit ) measures the effect of school attendance eit on human capital
formation and is assumed to be a continuous, increasing, and differentiable func-
tion on [0, 1]; that is, h′(eit ) > 0 for all eit ∈ [0, 1). We presume that h(0) = 0.
Equation (1) in combination with the assumption h(0) = 0 implies that λi,t+1 = 1
unless eit > 0.
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3.2. Production
There is one aggregated consumption good that is produced in two sectors. The
first sector is a land-based sector, such as agriculture, producing output solely by
using land and effective labor (human capital). Henceforth this will be termed
the agricultural sector and denoted by A. We assume that all farms are family-
based. Household i’s possession of land in period t is denoted by nit . Besides
the adult’s level of human capital λit , each child is endowed with human capital
at the level γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus the total supply of effective labor of a household is
[λit + (1 − eit )γ ]. The farm output in period t of household i, denoted by yAit , is
described by the production function2
yAit = B1 [λit + (1 − eit )γ ]α · (nit )1−α, (2)
where B1 represents the technical status quo of the sector and α ∈ (0, 1) the
production elasticity of the human capital input.
The second sector is solely human capital-based, and represents the industrial
and service sector. Henceforth this sector will be called sector I . Family farmers
cannot simultaneously work part-time in sector I . Hence labor is segmented
into workers in sector I and the family farm group in sector A.3 We assume a
proportional relationship between output and input of effective labor. B2 represents
the fixed productivity of a unit of effective labor. Accordingly, output per household
i in period t , labeled yIit , is given by
yIit = B2[λit + (1 − eit )γ ]. (3)
Neglecting production costs, yjit is equal to household income in sector j (j ∈
{A, I }).
3.3. Household Behavior
Consumption and education. The allocative decision of a household is deter-
mined by the household adult. The adult’s decision concerning consumption and
education is determined by utility maximization. The level of utility of adult i in
period t is denoted by uit . We assume that utility is determined by the period’s
consumption cit and by the level of education of the child: uit = u(cit , eit ). That
is, parents are altruistic and derive utility from the child’s schooling time eit .4 We
assume that adults have identical concave utility functions. Our major assumption
is that capital markets are imperfect, so poor households cannot borrow against
future earnings [cf. Ray (1998, chap. 14); Baland and Robinson (2000); Ranjan
(2001); Basu (2003, chap. 13); Bell (2003, chap. 15)].5 Thus the household’s
budget constraint in sector j is cit = yjit . In sector A the household’s income is
given by yAit = yA(nit , λit , eit ), and in sector I we have yIit = yI (λit , eit ). Hence
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the problem of household i can be stated as follows:
max
{cit , eit }
u(cit , eit ) s.t. cit = yjit and 0 ≤ eit ≤ 1. (4)
We denote the solution of the household problem by (eoit , coit ). Following Basu
and Van (1998) and many others, we assume that there will be no option but to put
the child to work full time if yjit is very small. At sufficiently high values of y
j
it ,
altruism will be operative in the sense that the parent will choose eit > 0. With
rising yjit , affluence is finally so high that the child will attend school full-time. This
concurs with Galor and Zeira (1993), who assume preferences on consumption
and bequest that generate the thresholds on human capital accumulation in their
setting. Following Ray and Streufert (1993), we assume that after the death of the
adult the child will inherit the household land.
A typical example is provided by Stone–Geary preferences in the form
u(cit , eit ) =
{
(cit − g)eit + g if c ≥ g
cit if c < g
(5)
for some g > 0. Such preferences yield two consumption levels, denoted by c
(lower) and cu (upper), with the following properties: As long as the household’s
budget does not allow consumption cit to be higher than c, the adult will choose
full-time child labor, and the child will not attend school at all: eoit = 0. However,
once cit > c
 is affordable, the child will attend school at least part-time. Finally,
if the household can afford a consumption level of cit ≥ cu, the child will attend
school full-time and does not have to work: eoit = 1. That is, preferences exoge-
nously determine minimum requirements for the adult’s willingness to choose
eit > 0, given by c, or to choose eit = 1, given by cu.
As both thresholds determine boundary solutions (eoit = 0 and eoit = 1), it is easy
to find the corresponding income thresholds. In sector A, income is determined
by the adult’s level of human capital, land ownership, and child labor, whereas in
sector I , income is solely determined by the adult’s level of human capital and
child labor. For our Stone–Geary preferences we directly obtain c = g. When
we maximize (5) for c ≥ g with respect to eit and subject to cit = yIit , we obtain
eoit = min{ 12 (1+λit/γ −g/B2γ ), 1}. Therefore λI = g/B2 −γ , λuI = g/B2 +γ ,
c = g, and cu = B2λuI = c + B2γ .
For our purposes, it is sufficient to know that the two threshold levels c and
cu exist and are determined by the preferences and technology parameters. We
summarize our assumptions as follows:
(i) In sector I , the two critical consumption levels c and cu are associated with human
capital levels
λI = c

B2
− γ
λuI = c
u
B2
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such that eoit = 0 for λit ≤ λI , 0 < eoit < 1 for λI < λit < λuI , and eoit = 1 for
λit ≥ λuI . The optimal educational choice eo(λit ) is strictly monotonically increasing
in λit on the interval (λI , λuI ).
(ii) In sector A, the two critical consumption levels c and cu are associated with the
human capital levels6
λA(nit ) =
[
c
B1(nit )1−α
]1/α
− γ
λuA(nit ) =
[
cu
B1(nit )1−α
]1/α
such that eoit = 0 for λit ≤ λA(nit ), 0 < eoit < 1 for λA(nit ) < λit < λuA(nit ),
and eoit = 1 for λit ≥ λuA(nit ). The optimal educational choice eo(λit , nit ) is strictly
monotonically increasing in λit on the interval (λA(nit ), λuA(nit )).
Some remarks about the impact of land holdings in sector A are apposite at this
point. Although the solution is solely determined by the level of the adult’s human
capital λit in sector I , it is additionally determined by the level of land ownership
nit in sector A. The larger the amount of land owned, the less human capital
is required for a given schooling level. Consequently, for sufficiently high nit ,
household consumption is higher than c even for λit = 1, so that eoit > 0 will be
chosen.7 Additionally, with high enough nit , even eoit = 1 is chosen for all levels
of λit ≥ 1.8 We define the corresponding levels of land, given a certain level of
human capital, by n(λit ) and nu(λit ) respectively:
n(λit ) =
[
c
B1(λit + γ )α
]1/(1−α)
(6)
nu(λit ) =
[
cu
B1(λit )α
]1/(1−α)
(7)
Location and migration. Finally, we need to analyze the household’s sector
choice. To distinguish location, we introduce variable ait , which takes the value 1
if household i is located in sector A and 0 if household i is in sector I . We assume
that the migration decision depends solely on sectoral income comparison, given
the household’s endowment with land, nit , and human capital, λit . Households
move between the sectors without cost. For the decision, it makes a difference
whether there are land markets or not. We start with the scenario without a land
market. We obtain
ait =
⎧⎨
⎩0 if
λit +
(
1 − eoit
)
γ
nit
>
(
B1
B2
)1/(1−α)
1 otherwise.
(8)
Equation (8) determines a ˜λ(nit ) such that, as long as λit < ˜λ(nit ), household i
is located in sector A, otherwise in sector I . Therefore if a low-educated adult
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does not possess a sufficient amount of land, he will work as a low-skilled laborer
in sector I . Due to decreasing marginal returns in sector A, however, sector I
turns out to be an attractive alternative for educated households as well, as soon
as human capital intensity per unit of land, λit/nit , becomes high enough.
Hence there are three groups of households: landless and uneducated households
in sector I ; land-owning households with a low or medium level of human capital
in sector A; and households with a high level of human capital in sector I .
3.4. Dynamics
In principle, the dynamics are the same in both sectors. To establish the dynamics
we have to analyze (1) in the light of our assumptions concerning household
behavior:
λi,t+1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 ∀ λit ≤ λj ;
1 + h(eoit )λit ∀ λit ∈ (λj , λuj );
1 + h(1)λit ∀ λit ≥ λuj ,
(9)
where j = {A, I }, λA = λA(nit ), and λuA = λuA(nit ); moreover, we have
eoit = eoit (λit , nit ) in sector A and eoit = eoit (λit ) in sector I . A detailed description
of the dynamics is given in an earlier version of this article [Gersbach and Siemers
(2005b)]. Here we focus on the growth case where h(1) > 1 and λj > 1. When
a household has reached full-time schooling, human capital grows at the rate
λi,t+1−λit
λit
= h(1) − 1 + 1/λit . Thus the growth rate decreases as human capital
rises but increases asymptotically at the constant rate h(1)− 1 > 0. Moreover, we
assume that h(eoit )λit is convex. Thus there exist one unstable stationary state at a
level λmj and the locally stable “poverty-trap” stationary state at λit = 1, where
1 < λj < λmj < λuj . This is illustrated in Figure B.1, which is also valid for a
given amount of land in sector A.
4. LAND REFORM
4.1. Land Redistribution
Here we examine how land reforms can be designed to overcome underdevel-
opment. We start with the scenario where the whole society is in a state of
backwardness. In particular, we assume that each adult in starting period t = 0
owns a plot of land of identical size n−1 > 0 and that λi0 = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, we assume that λA(n−1) > 1. So without government intervention all
adults will choose ei0 = 0 and the human capital of their offspring will remain at
λi = 1. Thus poverty (and child labor) perpetuates itself.9 Aggregate endowment
of land in the economy is given by N = ∫ 1
i=0 n−1(i)di. In order to determine
initial sector allocation we assume n−1 > (1 + γ )(B2/B1)1/(1−α); that is, initially
all households are located in the agrarian sector A.10
To examine land reforms we proceed as follows: From period t = 0 onwards,
the social planner redistributes land. We use {n¯it }1i=0 to denote the social planner’s
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redistribution scheme at the beginning of period t . That is, adult i receives addi-
tional land n¯it (if n¯it > 0) or is forced to donate land of size |n¯it | (if n¯it < 0).
Feasible land redistributions have to satisfy
∫ 1
0 n¯t (i)di = 0.
The sequence of events is as follows: At the beginning of a period t , an adult i
is endowed with human capital λit and land ni,t−1. A household i may or may not
be selected as a beneficiary of the land reform. As a beneficiary, the household
receives a plot of land of size nit > 0. If not selected, it may be forced to donate
land to the state for redistribution. For ease of presentation, we denote the size of
land expropriated from household i by nτit . In this case we have nit = −nτit < 0.
Actual land holdings in period t are then given by nit = ni,t−1 + n¯it . After land
redistribution all adults i ∈ [0, 1] make decisions on the sector they want to work
in, on consumption cit , and on the child’s education eit . This cycle is repeated
until the aim of the land reform is accomplished.
Because after an initial phase of nationalization in period t = 0, the social
planner redistributes land in each period t , we have a property rights system
comparable to the system called “leasehold in judicial terms” but without any
lease being charged. A household obtains land and receives full property rights.
However, after a given span of time the land may fall back to the state, either
wholly or in part. Recall that in our model a period is the complete productive life
of an adult. Hence the redistribution scheme can be interpreted as a particular type
of inheritance tax, as inherited land is a necessary condition for expropriation.
4.2. The Optimal Land Reform
In an attempt to educate a society as fast as possible, it is not clear a priori which
land transfers are “optimal.” To define our concept of optimal land reforms we
assume that the size of land transferred to a beneficiary in period t , nit , fulfills
eo(λit , ni,t−1 +nit ) = 1. The assumption is based on Siemers (2005) and Bell and
Gersbach (2009), who provide social welfare analyses concerning the education
of a society for models like ours and deduce that full-time schooling (and the
absence of child labor) for beneficiaries is optimal, at least at the beginning. The
minimal size of land a household must own in order to educate the child full-time,
denoted by nu(λit ), is given by (7) above. We use t i to denote the period in which
a household i receives a land gift. Hence we obtain11
λi,t i+1 = 1 + h(1)λiti . (10)
Because λi,t+1 > λit and nit = nu(λit ), continuous human capital accumulation
is ensured, ceteris paribus. Beneficiaries’ incomes are higher than threshold cu
and will continuously grow over time. Accordingly, the state can levy inheritance
taxes via expropriation on all previous beneficiaries without endangering its overall
objective. Thus, in each period, one has to check how much land the households
already supported still require to sustain full-time schooling. The rest of the land
can be redistributed. The maximal amount of land taken away from households
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that benefitted in the past is given by
nτit (λit ) = max
{
0, ni,t−1 − nu(λit )
} = max
{
0, ni,t−1 −
(
cu
B1λ
α
it
)1/(1−α)}
.
(11)
If a beneficiary’s level of human capital allows earning more than cu in sector
I , the household will switch sector and does not need any land to avoid poverty.
Thus, the social planner can even redistribute the entire land of the household.
We use δt to denote the share of households in the society that the social planner
allocates land to in period t . Moreover, we use µt to denote the fraction of the
society to which land has been allocated in a period t . Hence, µt =
∑t
k=0 δk and
δt = µt −µt−1. To redistribute land, it is necessary to nationalize some land from a
subset of citizens within a particular period. We assume throughout the paper that
the social planner can nationalize the required amount of land within a particular
period. The formal definitions are as follows:
DEFINITION 1. A society can be educated in T periods if there exists a land
redistribution scheme {{n¯it }1i=0}T −1t=0 , where
∫ 1
0 n¯t (i)di = 0, such that all house-
holds in sector A display λiT ≥ λuA(niT ) and all households in sector I display
λiT ≥ λuI , so that eiT = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 1].
DEFINITION 2. Given some initial distribution of land, an optimal land reform
is characterized by a sequence of land redistributions given by {{nit }1i=0}T −1t=0 that
fulfill (i) eoiT = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 1]; (ii)
∫ 1
0 nt (i) di = 0 for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1;
and (iii) there does not exist any other sequence {{nit }1i=0}T
′−1
t=0 with T ′ < T that
fulfills the three conditions above.
Condition (i) formalizes a fully educated society. Condition (ii) is the land
resource constraint and condition (iii) requires that no other dynamic land redistri-
bution scheme exists that would enable the society to be educated in a shorter space
of time. As we assume that beneficiaries will have total land nu(λit ), optimality is
restricted to this type of land reforms.12 We obtain
PROPOSITION 1. There exists an optimal dynamic land redistribution scheme
{{nit }1i=0}T −1t=0 . The education of a society is feasible in finite time; that is, T < ∞.
The proposition is proved in Appendix A. The essential features of the optimal
land reform are as follows: Educated households have to give land to the state
as long as this expropriation does not endanger the full-time schooling of the
household’s child. This enables the maximum amount of land to be distributed to
those uneducated so far. This land has to be distributed to as many households
as possible, with the constraint that each single supported household establishes
the optimal level of schooling for the household’s child. This ensures the fastest
possible education process. As this policy scheme generates continued human
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capital accumulation, the number of educated households grows from period to
period so that the society is educated in finite time. Note that the optimal scheme
is indeterminate in the following sense: It does not matter which particular uned-
ucated household i is selected as a beneficiary in a particular period t . Moreover,
we showed that the creation of inequality among the poor is a necessary condition
for escaping from backwardness.
4.3. Migration, Transition, and Inequality
A beneficiary has land of size nu(λit ). He or she is thus indifferent between sector
A and sector I if B2λit = cu, so that ˜λ(nit ) = ˜λ = cu/B2 = λuI . Hence, if
λit > λ
uI holds, a beneficiary household will switch to sector I . Accordingly we
obtain:
PROPOSITION 2. Each beneficiary stays in sector A for l periods before
switching to sector I . l is determined by minl>0
∑l
k=0 [h(1)]k > λuI .
Proposition 2 follows directly from the combination of (8) and ˜λ = λuI .13 The
next two propositions complete the description of the structural change induced
by the land reform.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that an optimal land reform is applied. Then the
migration pattern in period t > 0 is given as
ait =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if {λit < λuI and nit > 0}
0 or 1 if {λit = λuI and nit > 0}
0 if λit > λuI or if nit = 0
⎫⎬
⎭ for all i ∈ [0, 1].
PROPOSITION 4. All households will asymptotically leave sector A and end
up in sector I ; that is, ait = 0 for all i ∈ [0, 1] when t → ∞.
That is, in the prereform era, the society is agrarian. In the course of the land
reform, sector A is developing via individual accumulation of human capital.
When human capital reaches a critical level, sector I starts to develop. Finally,
sector A vanishes. Over time, all households escape poverty and child labor. The
proofs are given in Appendix A.
5. EXTENSIONS
In this section we discuss three main extensions of our framework.
5.1. Land Markets
Our first extension concerns land markets. This analysis is performed in our
working paper [Gersbach and Siemers (2005b)]. In particular, we show there that
it may be useful to restrict the access of beneficiaries to land markets temporarily.
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The reason is that the incentive to sell the land received and migrate occurs
irrespective of individual skill levels. So with open access to land markets, parents
may prefer to sell the land and switch sectors too early, that is, when they have
not yet accumulated enough (human) capital. This will result in the failure of the
land reform, as their descendants will stay in (or fall back into) the poverty trap.
To prevent such inefficient land sales, a (temporary) prohibition of land sales for
beneficiaries of the reform may be necessary.14
5.2. Property Rights
An issue for investigation is the extent to which property rights should be given to
beneficiaries. The advantage of doing so is that it increases the incentive of partic-
ipants to develop property and to make it more productive (effort and investment).
Also, that land can be used as collateral. On the other hand, strict property rights
undermine the potential for further land redistribution. In our model, beneficiaries
should be given property rights for the span of a whole life, but after the death of
the beneficiary generation, part of the transferred land can be confiscated again. In
this way, the incentive effect of property rights can function, albeit not to the full
extent. Also, for incentive reasons, it is useful to settle on a less extreme form of
land redistribution where there is an upper bound on the fraction of land an owner
has to give up for redistribution purposes.
5.3. The Political Economy of Land Reforms
The last extension concerns political barriers. The main obstacle is the disposses-
sion of land in the first period if the government possesses no land of its own.
In this period it is probably necessary for an amount of land to be taken away
from powerful landlords. The group of landowners forced to donate land in the
first period will vigorously oppose such actions and will have powerful incentives
for halting the process via lobbying activities and vote buying. Governments
therefore often renounce land reforms. In any case, it is thus useful to start with
a more moderate scheme with an upper bound on the fraction of land that can
be taken away. As with other forms of taxation, this upper bound should clearly
be below 50%. In all subsequent periods, however, it is possible to construct
growth-enhancing redistribution schemes where land is only taken away from
former beneficiaries.15 Moreover, the proportion of owners forced to donate land
for redistribution purposes must be sufficiently small for a government to be able
to build a stable majority in favor of a growth-enhancing redistribution scheme.
Otherwise the government itself may not be interested in pursuing land reforms,
because it may fear loss of power.
To improve the feasibility of our land reform, landlord households initially
loosing part of their land to the state should be guaranteed that all lost land will be
given back once the task of the reform is accomplished and no land redistribution
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is required anymore. Alternatively, particular forms of compensation could break
the opposition of landlords [Bell (2003, pp. 408–412)].
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
There is empirical evidence indicating that a higher degree of education and more
equitable land distribution may improve income distribution and enhance growth
[Lundberg and Squire (2003)]. We show that land reforms are a means of inducing
the transition from a society caught in a poverty trap to a developed, skill-based
economy where agriculture plays a minor role.16 The optimal land reform consists
of a sequence of land transfers rather than a one-time event only. Producing
(temporary) inequality among the poor is a necessary condition for optimal land
reforms. Inequality is required because land is scarce and land transfers have to
ensure not only viable farm sizes but also adequate (human) capital formation to
escape poverty traps.
Our analysis complements the insights of unified growth theory in explaining
the transition from stagnation to growth via human-capital formation. Regarding
the Great Diversion, this paper suggests that observed variations in human-capital
formation and comparative economic development could be attributed to historical
differences in the distribution of landownership across countries.
It is important to stress that land reforms may have two advantages over straight
income transfers [which are analyzed, for instance, by Bell and Gersbach (2009)]:
(i) In contrast to redistribution via transfers and taxes, land reforms do not require
a well-functioning fiscal authority that enforces tax collection, which developing
countries often lack. (ii) Direct income transfers must be repeated continuously,
if one-time subsidization is not sufficient to escape poverty traps [Gersbach and
Siemers (2005a); Siemers (2005, chap. 5)]. Land transfers increase income per-
manently and a fall-back into poverty is less likely than with income transfers.
The drawbacks of land reforms are the political barriers, as discussed in the last
section.
NOTES
1. See also Aghion et al. (1999), Swinnerton and Rogers (1999), Sylwester (2000), Birchenall
(2001), Eicher and Garcı´a-Pen˜alosa (2001), and Viaene and Zilcha (2003).
2. Deininger and Feder (1998, p. 16) report that a large number of empirical studies have been
unable to disprove the hypothesis of constant returns to scale in agricultural production.
3. A detailed justification of this assumption can be found in Gersovitz (1976, p. 84).
4. For expositional convenience, we neglect the child’s consumption. Our results can be generalized
to the case where the child’s consumption is a fixed fraction of the adult’s consumption.
5. The literature offers various justifications for this assumption. The most important is that future
human capital (and associated income) is not a means of offering credible future repayments to a
potential lender.
6. Note that λA (nit ) and λuA (nit ) are determined by c = B1
[
λA (nit ) + γ
]α
n1−αit and cu =
B1 [λuA (nit )]α n1−αit .
7. Hence for high enough nit , λA (nit ) < 1, and no lower threshold exists.
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8. That is, λuA (nit ) ≤ 1.
9. We analyze the worst case, where no household is willing to invest in education. Note that we
initially have equal land distribution but a society caught in a poverty trap.
10. We could also work with alternative initial conditions in which both sectors are populated at
the beginning [condition: n−1 = (B2/B1)1/(1−α)(1 + γ )] or all individuals are in the industrial sector
[condition: n−1 < (B2/B1)1/(1−α)(1+γ )]. The qualitative results in the paper would remain the same.
11. Choosing nu(λit ) means turning λit into λuA(nit ).
12. To explore land redistribution where beneficiaries can obtain more or less land is left for future
research.
13. See also equation (A.10) in Appendix A.
14. Even if we exclude distress sales due to macro shocks, open land market access may endanger
the success of the reform. For different reasons, Drazen and Eckstein (1988) and Deaton and Laroque
(2001) argue that land markets may be detrimental to growth, as savings in the form of land crowd out
growth-enhancing capital formation. However, Deaton and Laroque demonstrate that the Golden Rule
allocation can be established by nationalizing land and “renting” it out at no charge.
15. Once the process of development has passed its first stages, capitalists and landowners may, in
the medium term, have an incentive to support the provision of human capital formation [Galor and
Moav (2006); Poutvaara (2003)].
16. A similar transition can be found, for example, in U.S. history. Whereas at the time of inde-
pendence approximately 90% of the labor force was agricultural, today only 3% of it is employed in
farming [Johnson (1997)].
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We prove the proposition by deducing the optimal dynamic land redistribution scheme.
Transferring to each beneficiary i a plot of land such that total land is nu(λit ) guarantees
eoit = 1. As we can only distribute land of a size N , δ0 amounts to δ0 = N/nu(1). The
initial land redistribution can be summarized by
ni0 =
{
nu(1) − n−1 if i ∈ [0, δ0];
−n−1 otherwise. (A.1)
This results in human capital formation in the following way:
λi1 =
{
1 + h(1) ∀ i ∈ [0, δ0]
1 otherwise (A.2)
In the following period, the proportion δ0 can be expropriated according to nτi1(λi1) =
nu(1) − nu(1 + h(1)). (Confiscating more land would result in an education choice eit
below unity, so that child labor would again prevail in beneficiary households. In the worst
case, beneficiaries would fall back into the poverty trap, when λit < λm. Thus, the success
of the reform would only be temporary.)
Expropriation results in an increase of beneficiaries’ human capital intensity. Thus the
group δ0 possibly wishes to switch to sector I [see condition (8)]. For all i ∈ [0, δ0] alike
we obtain
ai1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩1 if
λi1
ni0 − nτi1
≤
(
B1
B2
) 1
1−α
;
0 otherwise.
(A.3)
Hence expropriation must be made contingent on whether beneficiaries will switch to sector
I . Applying (7), we obtain for the group of first beneficiaries (i ∈ [0, δ0]):
nτi1(λi1, ai1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(
cu
B1
) 1
1−α ·
[
1 −
(
1
1+h(1)
) α
1−α
]
if ai1 = 1;(
cu
B1
) 1
1−α
otherwise,
(A.4)
so that beneficiaries leaving the land-based sector waive their claim on the plot of land
received. Thus the social planner will have the following amount of land at its disposal in
period 1:
∫ δ0
i=0
nτ1(1 + h(1), at (i)) di = δA0
{[
1 −
(
1
1 + h(1)
) α
1−α
](
cu
B1
) 1
1−α
}
+ δI0
(
cu
B1
) 1
1−α
,
(A.5)
where δA0 =
∫ δ0
0 ait di and δ
I
0 =
∫ δ0
0 (1 − ait ) di. (The existence of the Lebesque integral can
be guaranteed by appropriate tie-breaking rules when households are indifferent between
sectors A and I .)
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The next land redistribution scheme is
ni1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
−nτi1(1 + h(1), ai1) for i ∈ [0, δ0];
nu(1) for i ∈ (δ0, δ0 + δ1];
0 otherwise,
(A.6)
where δ1 = [
∫ 1
i=0 n
τ
i1(λ1(i), a1(i)) di]/nu(1). Thus, within fraction µ1 = δ0 + δ1 of the
population, all households display eoi1 = 1. The land transfers in period 1 have to fulfill the
constraint
δ1n
u(1) =
∫ 1
0
nτi1 (λ1(i), a1(i)) di (A.7)
For the human capital levels in t = 2 we obtain
λi2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 + h(1)[1 + h(1)] for i ∈ [0, δ0];
1 + h(1) for i ∈ (δ0, µ1];
1 otherwise.
(A.8)
Due to human capital accumulation, beneficiary incomes rise, and the described redistribu-
tion mechanism can be repeated. In general, in any period t , land redistribution takes the
following form:
nit =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−nτit (λit , ait ) for i ∈ [0, µt−1];
nu(1) for i ∈ (µt−1, µt ];
0 otherwise.
(A.9)
As beneficiaries are left with enough income so that they will choose full education, human
capital accumulation evolves according to
λit =
{∑t−t i
k=0 [h(1)]k for t ≥ t i;
1 for t < ti .
(A.10)
Thus the human capital of beneficiaries continuously rises. The general expropriation rule
is given by
nτit =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
cu
B1
)1/(1−α) ⎡⎣
(
1∑t−t i−1
k=0 [h(1)]k
)α/(1−α)
−
(
1∑t−t i
k=0 [h(1)]k
)α/(1−α)⎤⎦
if ait = 1, i ∈ [0, µt−1];
⎛
⎝ cu
B1
{∑t−t i−1
k=0 [h(1)]k
}α
⎞
⎠
1/(1−α)
if (ait = 0 and ai,t−1 = 1), i ∈ [0, µt−1];
0 otherwise.
(A.11)
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The share of the society entitled to obtain nu(1) in a period t is given by
δt = min
{∫ 1
0 n
τ
it di
nu(1)
, 1 − µt−1
}
. (A.12)
According to (A.11) we have ∫ 10 nτit di ≥ 0 and thus µt ≥ µt−1.
In the final step we have to show that µt becomes unity in finite time. This is shown by
contradiction.
Suppose that µt < 1 for all t and thus T is not finite. Two cases could occur: limt→∞ µt <
1 or limt→∞ µt = 1. Choose some arbitrarily small θ with N/2nu(1) > ε > 0 and a period
tˆ such that |µtˆ − limt→∞ µt | < ε. Choose some arbitrarily small θ with 12 > θ > 0.
According to the expropriation rule, there exists a time period ˆtˆ > tˆ such that n
i ˆtˆ
< θN for
all i ∈ [0, µtˆ ]. (Note that the land size required to induce eo = 1 converges to zero when
human capital grows without bounds.)
The available land for households i ∈ (µˆtˆ , 1] is therefore at least N(1−θµtˆ ) > N(1−θ).
Hence, at least N(1 − θ)/nu(1) > N/2nu(1) > ε households could be allocated a plot
nu(1) and these beneficiaries would choose full education. Hence, µˆtˆ+1 > µˆtˆ + ε and we
obtain a contradiction, since µˆtˆ+1 > limt→∞ µt . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
In all periods t > 0, all not-yet-supported households own no land (nit = 0) and display
ait = 0, because yA(n = 0) = 0. Land reform beneficiaries own a plot of land of size
nu(λit ) and thus consume cu. Applying ˜λ = λuI , we obtain ait = 0 in equilibrium if
λit > λ
uI and ait = 1 if λit < λuI . If λit = λuI , household i is indifferent between sector
A and sector I . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
A household i will switch to sector I as soon as λit /nit >
(
B1/B2)
1/1−α
. Due to h(1) > 1,
human capital grows infinitely. It follows that in each beneficiary household the human
capital–to–land ratio will exceed
(
B1/B2)
1/1−α at a certain point in time. 
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APPENDIX B
FIGURE B.1. Convex human capital technology where λj > 1, 1 + h(1)λuj > λuj , and
h(1) > 1, for j = {A, I }. The figure is valid for both sectors. However, in sector A
we have λA = λA(nit ), λmA = λmA(nit ), and λuA = λuA(nit ), where ∂λk/∂nit < 0 for
k = {A,mA, uA}; that is, the figure holds for a given amount of land.
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